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We analyzed cigarette smoking among people aged 15 - 24 in approximately 90,000 households in
the 1992 - 1999 U.S. Current Population Surveys. We modeled social influence as an informational
externality, in which each young person’s smoking informs her peers about its “coolness.” The
resulting “family smoking game,” with each sibling’s smoking endogenous, may have multiple
equilibria. We found that the pro-smoking influence of a fellow smoker markedly exceeded the
deterrent effect of a non-smoking peer. The phenomenon of asymmetric social influence has
implications for financial markets, educational performance, criminal behavior, and other areas of
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economists have devoted considerable theoretical and empirical attention
to the study of social interactions, but few have inquired whether such
interactions might be asymmetric.
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman [1996] observed, for example, that
rates of larceny and auto theft in a neighborhood influence the propensity of
young residents to commit such crimes.  One might further ask, could the
deterrent effect of a decrease in the neighborhood crime rate be absolutely larger
or smaller than the crime-enhancing effect of an increase in the crime rate?  Clark
and Oswald [1996] found that workers’ job satisfaction was significantly
negatively correlated with their co-workers’ income.  One might similarly ask,
could the disutility of a high-income coworker be greater or smaller than the
utility of a low-income colleague?  Kindleberger [1989], Bikhchandani ,
Hirshleifer, and Welch [1992, 1998] and Lux [1998] and others have studied the
“contagion of opinion” in financial markets, where investors follow the behavior
of other fellow traders to form expectations about future prices.  One might
further inquire, do investors make different inferences when they see their peers
buy, rather than sell, securities?  Only in the literature on school performance, it
appears, have Sacerdote [2001], Hoxby [2002], and Winston and Zimmerman
[2003] formally inquired whether a low achiever gains more by being in a class
(or dorm room) with a high achiever than a high achiever loses by being with a
low achiever.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 4
Numerous authors have similarly observed a young person’s decision to
smoke is influenced by peers’ smoking practices. (See, for example, Flay et al.
[1994], Wang et al. [1995], Engels et al. [1997], Norton, Lindrooth, and Ennett
[1998], DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios [2000], Wang, Eddy, and Fitzhugh [2000],
Gaviria and Raphael [2001], Alexander et al. [2001], Simons-Morton et al. [2001],
Norton, Lindrooth, and Ennett [2003].)  Yet no one, to our knowledge, has
explicitly raised the possibility such peer influence might be asymmetric, too.
Our task in this paper is to do just that.   We focus sharply on social
interactions within the household unit, rather than larger peer groups, such as
those at school or work.  We find, in fact, that the pro-smoking influence of one
fellow smoker markedly exceeds the deterrent effect of a non-smoking peer.
The implications of asymmetry in social interactions are extensive.  If the
positive effect of a high-performing peer exceeds the negative effect of a low
performer, then mixing good and bad workers or students might enhance overall
group performance.  Conversely, if the deterrent effect of a non-smoking peer is
weaker than the pro-smoking effect of a fellow smoker, then rules that segregate
smokers will reduce overall smoking rates.  What is more, when peer effects are
nonlinear, tracking or clustering may create positive externalities only when the
number of peers reaches a critical mass.  (See Hoxby [2002].)
It is well known that social interactions can create multiplier effects
(Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman [2002]), and such a phenomenon has not
been lost on researchers who have studied teenage smoking (Lewit, Coate, andHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 5
Grossman [1981], Harris and Chan [1999], Gruber [2000], and Krauth [2001]).  In
the presence of positive social externalities, an increase in the price of cigarettes
(or, for that matter, a change in any exogenous factor that influences smoking
rates) will have a larger aggregate effect than the sum of the effects on each
individual separately.  This “social multiplier” effect has, in fact, been used to
explain why teenagers seem to have higher price elasticities of demand than
adult smokers.
But if social interactions are asymmetric, then social multipliers can be
asymmetric, too.  In that case, an increase in the price of cigarettes could have a
different absolute effect on the rate of teenage smoking than a decrease in price.
Such a phenomenon, in fact, may underlie the observation that teenage smoking
rates rebounded sharply after the 1993 premium brand price war, but have
declined only sluggishly in times of price hikes (Gruber [2001]).   In the context of
financial markets, asymmetric social multipliers might offer an explanation for
slow, modulated booms and rapid busts.
In the next section, we define the scope of our problem.  In Section III, we
propose a simple model of informational externalities that guides our empirical
analysis.  In Section IV, we analyze the resulting “family smoking game,” in
which each young person’s smoking is endogenous, and where multiple Nash
equilibria can obtain.  Section V then details our econometric methods.  Finally,
sections VI and VII present our results and conclusions.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 6
II. THE PROBLEM
Table 1 shows the prevalence of current cigarette smoking among persons
aged 15–24 years in relation to the smoking status of other young people, aged
15–24, who reside in the same household.  The cross-tabulation is based upon
122,010 individual responses to the Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS) that were
appended to the U.S. Current Population Surveys during three waves:
September 1992 – May 1993; September 1995 – May 1996; and September 1998 –
May 1999.  (See U.S. Bureau of the Census [1996, 1998].)  Each cell in Table 1
shows the proportion who currently smoke, as well as the sample size, the
number of households, and the log-odds of current smoking.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.]
As Table 1 shows, a young person (call her “Bea”) who resides in a
household with no other young people has a 19 percent probability of currently
smoking.  Although the pattern is not completely consistent in the largest
households, where the sample sizes are small, the inclusion of nonsmoking
housemates appears to decrease Bea’s probability of smoking, while the addition
of more smokers appears to increase her probability of smoking.  Thus, if only
one young nonsmoker also resides in the household, then Bea’s probability of
smoking falls to 12 percent, and if there is a second young nonsmoker in
residence, then Bea’s probability of smoking falls further to 8 percent.  On the
other hand, if only one young smoker resides in the household, then Bea’s
probability of smoking rises from 19 to 50 percent, and if a second smoker isHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 7
resident, then Bea’s probability of smoking rises further to 63 percent.  What is
more, the quantitative effect of including one more smoking housemate appears
to exceed the effect of including one more nonsmoking housemate.  For example,
if Bea started out with no young housemates, then adding two nonsmokers
would reduce her log-odds of smoking by 0.99, while adding two smokers
would increase her log-odds by 1.98.
Although the data in Table 1 suggest the presence of strong social
influences within the household, we need to be wary of the possibility of self-
selection, that is, Bea simply chose to cohabit with housemates who had
compatible smoking habits.  In the TUS sample, however, only 4 percent of
young persons residing in the same household were unrelated.  In all likelihood,
most young people had little choice but to live with their parents and other
siblings.  For convenience, in what follows, we shall use the terms “sibling” and
“young housemate” interchangeably.
Quite apart from self-selection, we need to be concerned that the observed
concordance of smoking among young people is simply the result of other
common, observable family influences.  It is well known, for example, that
smoking prevalence is inversely related to family income (e.g., Harris and Chan
[1999]).  Since variations in retail cigarette prices are largely determined by state
excise tax rates, residents of the same family are likely to face nearly identical
prices.  The presence or absence of smoking adults may similarly influence theHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 8
smoking practices of young people in a household.  In some households,
smoking is not permitted.
It is also possible that unobserved common influences, or common shocks,
within the same household underlie the patterns observed in Table 1.  While the
TUS explicitly asked respondents whether smoking was permitted in the home,
there may be an unstated family rule that nobody should smoke in the presence
of an infirm, elderly relative.  Or perhaps the underage siblings in the same
household may obtain cigarettes from the same source in the schoolyard.
Even if we properly took account of self-selection, observed characteristics
and unobserved common shocks, we would still be faced with the conundrum of
two-way causation, what Manski [1993] has called the reflection problem.  Suppose
that 18-year-old Bea has a 19-year-old brother Jeff who lives in the same
household and does not smoke cigarettes.  We observe that Bea likewise does not
smoke.  Now consider an otherwise identical two-sibling household, endowed
with the same income, facing the same retail cigarette prices, caring for the same
sick grandmother.  In this clone household, 18-year-old Bea has a 19-year-old
brother Jeff who does smoke cigarettes, and we observe that Bea likewise
smokes.  Do we conclude that Jeff’s smoking practices influenced Bea’s?  Or is it
the other way around?
If we could perform such an experiment, then we could at least measure
the two-way social interaction between Bea’s and Jeff’s smoking.  Beyond that,
we would have to impose strong restrictions to infer one-way causation.  WeHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 9
could posit, for example, that if Jeff began to smoke before Bea, then Jeff caused
Bea to smoke, but not vice versa.  Such a restriction is dubious because Bea’s
smoking, even if she began after Jeff started, may also be keeping Jeff from
quitting.
When we observe households with three or more young people, however,
we can impose restrictions that follow naturally from the organization of the data
in Table 1.  Suppose that we observed another household, with Bea and Jeff as
above, which differed from the first clone in that there was a third sibling, 20-
year-old Pepe.  The combined influence of Bea’s two housemates on Bea’s
smoking, we posit, depends only on the number of smoking siblings, and not
their identity.  In that case, all other things equal, Bea’s probability of smoking
when Jeff does smoke and Pepe doesn’t is the same as her probability of smoking
when Jeff doesn’t and Pepe does.  When we impose such a restriction, and when
we use the data on both the two-sibling and three-sibling households together,
then as we will see below, we can identify the one-way causal effect of one
young person’s smoking on all the remaining sibs.
Even if we could confront the reflection problem, there is still one more
knot to untie.  Return to our two-sibling household with only Bea and Jeff.  Let’s
assume that if Jeff smokes, then with 100% probability Bea will smoke, too.
Likewise, if Bea smokes, then with certainty Jeff will smoke, too.  In that case,
there are two equally logical outcomes: both Bea and Jeff do not smoke; both Bea
and Jeff do smoke.  In this example, we know everything about the household,Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 10
including the one-way effect of Jeff’s smoking or Bea and vice versa.  Yet we
cannot make an unequivocal, unique prediction about who smokes and who
doesn’t.  This indeterminacy is what Tamer [2002, 2003] has called the problem of
incoherence.  In effect, we have a static binary game between Bea and Jeff, in
which there are two Nash equilibria.  And in families with more than two
siblings, it is not hard to imagine that there can be more than two such equilibria.
As we will see below, one way to address the problem of incoherence is to
specify additional rules that determine which equilibrium will obtain.
Before we squarely confront the above-noted problems of common
shocks, reflection and incoherence, we first need to specify a model that
elucidates why Bea’s smoking decision might actually depend on Jeff’s.  For this
purpose, we could simply make the ad hoc assumption that Bea’s utility from
smoking depends on the group average smoking rate (e.g., Brock and Durlauf
[2001], Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull [1999]).  Or we could specifically assume
that Bea gets greater utility from smoking when she and Jeff smoke together.
Such notions of joint production especially make sense in the context of illicit
drug use, where heroin users share syringes and other paraphernalia, or where
cocaine users congregate in crack houses.  We might point out, for example, that
Jeff, as an experienced smoker, teaches the technology of consumption to Bea the
novice (Jones [1994].)  Alternatively, we could also model peer influence as a
network externality, a phenomenon that seems apt for drug users, too.  In what
follows, we devise a model of peer influence that relies on informationalHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 11
externalities in a manner similar to that used by analysts of financial markets
(Bikhchandani , Hirshleifer, and Welch [1992, 1998]).
III. A LEARNING MODEL
We think of each young person as uncertain whether smoking cigarettes
is, on the one hand, a safe, non-addicting and socially acceptable thing to do, or
on the other hand, a dangerous, addicting and socially passe practice.  Such a
young person draws inferences from her peers’ smoking to resolve this
uncertainty.  Although her peer group is likely to be much larger than her
household, her siblings’ practices provide important data that she relies upon to
revise her prior beliefs about the likelihood that smoking is, in fact, the “cool”
thing to do.  In what follows, we use “cool” as a shorthand term for safe, non-
addicting and socially acceptable, while “uncool” is short-hand for dangerous,
addictive and passe.
A stylized version of the decision faced by such a young person, whom
we call “Bea,” is shown in Figure 1 below.  At the square choice node, Bea
decides whether or not to smoke.  We assume that Bea does not take account of
the possibility that her own smoking may influence its social desirability in her
peer group.  Thus, her subjective probability j that smoking is “cool” does not
depend on her own smoking decision.  Since we observe only the smoking
practices of individual household members and not those of her larger peer
group, we refrain from any rational-expectations assumptions that relate Bea’sHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 12
subjective probability j to the actual prevalence of smoking in the larger peer
group.  Since our focus is on social interactions, we sidestep questions as to
whether Bea makes a myopic short-run decision or formulates a long-run
lifetime plan.  (See Becker and Murphy [1988], Becker, Grossman, and Murphy
[1994].)
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.]
We model uncertainty about the “coolness” of smoking by the circular
chance nodes emanating from both the “smoke” and “not smoke” branches in
the figure.  Associated with each (action, state of nature) pair is a terminal utility.
Thus  1 V  is the utility of smoking when it turns to be “cool,” while  2 V  is the
utility of smoking if it turns out to be “uncool.”   3 V  is the utility of refraining
from smoking when it turns to be “cool,” while  4 V  is the utility of not smoking
when it turns out to be “uncool.” We assume that  0 3 1 > - = V V B .  That is, Bea
experiences a positive benefit B from smoking when it is “cool” to smoke.
Conversely, we assume that  0 2 4 > - = V V C .  That is, she experiences a cost C of
lighting up when it is “uncool” to do so.
The difference between the expected utility of smoking,  2 1 ) 1 ( V V j - + j ,
and the expected utility of not smoking,  4 3 ) 1 ( V V j - + j , is
(1) C C B V V V V - + j = j - + j - j - + j ) ( } ) 1 ( { ) 1 ( 4 3 2 1Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 13
Bea smokes so long as this difference in expected utility is non-negative.  Let us
denote Bea’s smoking behavior by the binary variable  1 y , where  1 1 = y  if Bea
smokes and  0 1 = y  if not.  Then Bea smokes so long as her subjective probability
j is no less than a threshold value j ~, that is,




= j ~ ; and
0 1 = y  otherwise
The pair  ) ~ , ( j j  thus describes Bea’s subjective beliefs about the coolness of



















= m ~ 1
~
ln ~  as the log-odds transformations of j and j ~,
respectively, we can rewrite the condition (2) as
(3) 1 1 = y  if  0 ~ ‡ m - m , where   B C ln ln ~ - = m ; and
0 1 = y  otherwise
We now inquire how information about a peer’s smoking practices can
influence Bea’s own decision to smoke.  In particular, we assume that Bea has a
point prior distribution on j and, in Bayesian fashion, updates this prior when
she learns whether or not her brother Jeff smokes cigarettes.  Let l denote the
probability that Jeff would smoke if it were “cool” to do so, and let w denote the
probability that Jeff would refrain from smoking if it were “uncool.”  If we think
of Jeff’s smoking as a diagnostic test of the “coolness” of smoking, then l is theHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 14
test’s sensitivity, while w represents the test’s specificity.  When the sensitivity l
is high, Bea thinks, “My brother Jeff would definitely smoke if it were the cool
thing to do.”  When specificity w is high, the Bea thinks, “My brother Jeff
wouldn’t be caught dead with a cigarette if it weren’t cool.”  When  1 > +w l ,
Jeff’s smoking is informative about its “coolness.” By contrast, when  1 = +w l ,
Jeff’s smoking is entirely uninformative, and knowledge of Jeff’s smoking would
have no effect on Bea’s prior j.
If Jeff in fact smokes, then by Bayes’ rule, the log-odds of Bea’s posterior
probability that smoking is “cool” becomes
(4) ) 1 ln( ln w - - l + m
If Jeff does not smoke, then the log-odds of Bea’s posterior probability that
smoking is “cool” becomes
(5) w - l - + m ln ) 1 ln(
Let us similarly denote Jeff’s smoking behavior by the binary variable  2 y ,
where  1 2 = y  if Jeff smokes and  0 2 = y  if not.  Then, in light of the information
about Jeff’s smoking, Bea’s decision to smoke can be described by the rule





















+ m - m y y ; and
0 1 = y  otherwiseHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 15
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ln  will be strictly negative, which means that Jeff’s abstaining
) 0 ( 2 = y  will reinforce Bea’s decision to refrain.
Jeff’s influence on Bea, however, has a built-in asymmetry.   That is, the
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.  So long as
Jeff’s smoking is informative ( 1 > w + l ), this condition is equivalent to  l > w ,
that is, the specificity of Jeff’s smoking exceeds its sensitivity.  Conversely, the
dissuading influence of Jeff’s abstaining exceeds the reinforcing influence of his
smoking when  l < w .  Only when  l = w  would symmetric social influence
prevail.
Generalizing across an arbitrary number  1 > n  of young persons in a
household, we now let  ) ~ , ( i i m m  denote the prior beliefs and preferences of young
person i, while we let  i y  be the binary variable representing that person’s
smoking practices.  For now, we make the simplifying assumption that eachHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 16
young person views the smoking practices of each of her siblings as independent
information about the “coolness” of smoking.  Thus, if Bea had another brother,
Pepe, she would not dismiss the fact of Pepe’s smoking as uninformative simply
because he might copy his brother Jeff.
Once young person i observes the smoking habits of all of her siblings
} ; { i j y j „ , her posterior probability that smoking is “cool” is (in log-odds form)
(7) { } { }￿ ￿
„ „
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= a  for compactness of notation.
(The inverse mapping is  
) exp( ) exp(
) exp( ) exp(
a - k
a + k - k
= l  and 




= w .)  We
also denote  ) ~ ( i i i u m - m = .  Then each young person’s smoking is described by
the rule







j i y y u ; and
0 = i y otherwise
Letting  a - k = q , we can rewrite the rule (8) as




j i y n u ; and   0 = i y  otherwiseHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 17
for all  n i , , 1 K = .  Since  0 > k  and  0 < a , we know that  0 > q .  The coefficients
kand a, respectively, gauge the effects of importing a young smoker or
importing a young nonsmoker into the household.  By contrast, the coefficient q
measures the net effect of a young person’s switching from a nonsmoker to a
smoker in a household with a fixed number n of young people.
In equation (8), the term  ) ~ ( i i i u m - m =  captures each young person’s prior
beliefs  ) ( i m about the “coolness” of smoking, as well as the perceived net benefits
of smoking  ) ln ln ~ ( i i i C B - = m - .  The former can depend on other social
influences, such as the smoking practices of adults and peers outside the
household, or any other information about the perceived dangers or acceptability
of smoking.  The latter can depend on the price of cigarettes, income, age,
gender, and other personal or household characteristics.  In anticipation of the
empirical analysis below, we therefore specify the linear link function
(10) i i i Z X u e + g + b =
for all  n i , , 1 K = , where  i X  is a vector of observable personal characteristics, Z
is a vector of observable household characteristics,  ) , ( g b  is a parameter vector,
and  i e  is a disturbance term that captures unobservable factors.  We have





j i y n Z X ; and
0 = i y  otherwiseHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 18
for all  n i , , 1 K = . For now, we need assume only that the unobserved factors are
random variables  ) , , ( 1 n e e K  with a common mean of zero and a joint
cumulative distribution function F .  In what follows, it will be helpful to
abbreviate  ) 1 ( - a + g + b = n Z X W i i  for all  n i , , 1 K = , so that (11) becomes





j i y W ; and  0 = i y  otherwise
So long as we assume that each young person views the smoking practices
of each of her siblings as independent information about the “coolness” of
smoking, the parameters a and q in equation (11) will remain constant and
independent of the total number of siblings n in the family.  However, if Bea
recognizes the interdependence of the smoking practices of her brothers Jeff and
Pepe, then the additional observation that Pepe smokes may be more or less
informative than the initial observation that Jeff smoked.  In that case, we expect
the parameter q to vary with n.  While we continue to assume that a and q are
constant in the upcoming discussion of the equilibria of the system (12), we shall
relax this assumption in our econometric analyses later on.
IV. THE FAMILY SMOKING GAME
We can think of the system (12) as delineating the strategies of each player
in an n-person static, binary, simultaneous-move game.  In this “family smokingHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 19
game,” as we will call it, each young person’s decision to smoke (that is,  1 = j y )
enhances the propensity of the others to follow suit (that is,  1 = i y ).  Our family
smoking game differs from the market entry games studied by Bresnahan and
Reiss [1990], Berry [1992], and others, where the entry of a rival firm  j  into the
market (that is,  1 = j y ) makes it less profitable for firm i to be in the market (that
is,  1 = i y ).  It also differs from the binary game studied by Tamer [2003], in
which  1 = j y  makes it more likely that  1 = i y , but   1 = i y  makes it less likely
that  1 = j y .  However, like the market entry game and Tamer’s game, the family
smoking game can have multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
To illustrate the point, consider a family with two young people, where
Bea is young person #1, while her brother Jeff is young person #2.  The system
(12) becomes
(13) 0 if 1 1 2 1 1 ‡ e + q + = y W y ;  0 1 = y  otherwise
0 if 1 2 1 2 2 ‡ e + q + = y W y ;  0 2 = y  otherwise
When  1 1 W - ‡ e , smoking cigarettes is a dominant strategy for Bea, that is, she
will smoke whether or not Jeff does.  Conversely, when  q - - < e 1 1 W , abstaining
from smoking is a dominant strategy for her.  But when  1 1 1 W W - ‡ e > q - - ,
Bea will choose to smoke only if Jeff does, too.  In the region of the  ) , ( 2 1 e e  plane
where  q - - ‡ e > - 1 1 1 W W  and  q - - ‡ e > - 2 2 2 W W , there will be twoHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 20
equilibria:  ) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( 2 1 = y y ; and  ) 1 , 1 ( ) , ( 2 1 = y y .  The situation is illustrated in
Figure 2 below, which plots the different pure-strategy equilibria in the  ) , ( 2 1 e e
plane.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
The 3-sibling family smoking game, involving Bea, Jeff, and Pepe (sibling
#3), entails similar rules:
(14) 0 ) ( if 1 1 3 2 1 1 ‡ e + + q + = y y W y ;  0 1 = y  otherwise
0 ) ( if 1 2 3 1 2 2 ‡ e + + q + = y y W y ;  0 2 = y  otherwise
0 ) ( if 1 3 2 1 3 3 ‡ e + + q + = y y W y ;  0 3 = y  otherwise
While we do not display all possible equilibria in the  ) , , ( 3 2 1 e e e  plane for
this game, we do show in Figure 3 the equilibria in the  ) , ( 3 2 e e  subspace where
q - - ‡ e > q - - 2 1 1 1 W W , that is, were Bea smokes only when both of her
siblings smoke, too.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.]
In the lower right rectangle in the figure, where the disturbances
) , , ( 3 2 1 e e e  satisfy { } 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 ; ; 2 e > q - - - ‡ e q - - ‡ e > q - - W W W W ,
smoking is a dominant strategy for Jeff (sibling #2), while abstinence is a
dominant strategy for Pepe (sibling #3).  Bea (sibling #1) will therefore abstain,
too, and the sole equilibrium is  ) 0 , 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( 3 2 1 = y y y .  In the rectangleHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 21
immediately above that one, where  ) , , ( 3 2 1 e e e  instead satisfies
{ } q - - ‡ e > q - - - ‡ e q - - ‡ e > q - - 2 ; ; 2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 W W W W W , smoking
remains Jeff’s dominant strategy.  However, Bea will smoke only if Pepe does,
too, and vice versa.  Thus, we have two equilibria in pure strategies:
) 0 , 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( 3 2 1 = y y y  and (1,1,1).  In the central rectangle where no sibling has a
dominant strategy, the two Nash equilibria are:   ) 0 , 0 , 0 ( ) , , ( 3 2 1 = y y y  and (1,1,1).







is uniquely determined even when there are multiple equilibria.  Thus, in the 2-
firm market entry game, there is a region of the  ) , ( 2 1 e e  plane where both
) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 2 1 = y y  and  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 2 1 = y y  are equilibria.  In that case, we can still say
that there will be exactly one entrant into the market, even if we cannot specify
which firm.  In the family smoking game, however, we cannot uniquely
determine the number of smokers.  In the center rectangle in Figure 2, there can
either be 0 or 2 smokers, and in the center rectangle of Figure 3, there can be 0 or
3 smokers.
While the 2- and 3-sibling games have at most two pure-strategy
equilibria, this is not generally the case.  Consider a 4-sibling smoking game in
which both Bea (#1) and Jeff (#2) will smoke if just one sibling does, too (that is,
2 , 1 ; = q - - ‡ e > - i W W i i i ), while Pepe (#3) and Silvia (#4) will each smoke
only if at least 3 siblings do, too (that is,  4 , 3 ; 3 2 = q - - ‡ e > q - - i W W i i i ).  ThenHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 22
there are three pure-strategy equilibria:  ) 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ( ) , , , ( 4 3 2 1 = y y y y ; (1,1,0,0); and
(1,1,1,1).
In those regions of the  ) , , , ( 2 1 n e e e K  space where multiple pure-strategy
equilibria prevail, the family smoking game does admit a unique mixed strategy
equilibrium.  For example, when  ) , ( 2 1 e e  belongs to the central rectangle in
Figure 2, the mixed strategy equilibrium entails Bea’s smoking with probability
q
e +
- 2 2 W
 and Jeff’s smoking with probability 
q
e +
- 1 1 W
.   When  2 > n and no
player has a dominant strategy, the mixed strategy equilibrium entails sibling i








e + - e +
q ￿
„




j j i i W W
n
.  In the context of youth
smoking initiation, we find it difficult to devise a realistic interpretation for such
mixed strategies.  Nor do we see any appeal in a Stackelberg solution, as
explored in other contexts by Kooreman [1994], Bjorn and Vuong [1997],
Hiedemann [1998], and Chao [2002].   If Jeff is older than Bea, then his smoking
can exert a greater influence on her than vice versa, but this does not imply that
Jeff “pre-commits” to smoking.  As discussed below, sensitivity analyses of
alternative model specifications indicated that the net influence parameter q did
not depend significantly on a sibling’s age.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 23
V. ECONOMETRIC METHODS
As Tamer [2002, 2003] has explained, the structural parameters of models
such as that specified in equations (11) and (12) can sometimes be identified even
when the model itself is rendered “incomplete” by the existence of multiple
equilibria.  In the case of the family smoking game, with sufficiently rich data on
the observables } , , { y Z X , we should in principle be able to distinguish between
exogenous effects  ) , ( g b , and the endogenous effect q.  Moreover, if we study
households of different sizes n, then we can identify the parameter a as well.
Although Tamer [2002, 2003] has suggested several novel strategies for
estimation, we resort to a more practical approach.  In particular, we assume that
in those regions of the  ) , , , ( 2 1 n e e e K  space where multiple pure-strategy
equilibria prevail, the observed equilibrium is the outcome of a random trial
governed by mixing probabilities that we estimate as incidental parameters.
The case of the two-sibling family illustrates our approach.  Let us assume
that the disturbances  ) , ( 2 1 e e  are joint normally distributed with zero means,
unit variances, and correlation coefficient r.  The probability that  ) , ( 2 1 e e  lies in
the center region of Figure 2, where there are multiple equilibria, is
(15)
) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 r F + r q + F - r q + F - r q + q + F = W W W W W W W W RHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 24
where  ) , , ( r F v u  is the corresponding bivariate cumulative normal cumulative
distribution function.  We assume that when the pair  ) , ( 2 1 e e  lies in the center
region in Figure 2, the observed equilibrium is the outcome of a Bernoulli trial,
with probability p of the all-smoker equilibrium (1,1), and probability  p - 1  of
the all-nonsmoker equilibrium (0,0).   If both Bea and Jeff are observed to smoke,
that is,  ) 1 , 1 ( ) , ( 2 1 = y y , then the contribution of such an observation to the
likelihood function is
(16) R W W ) 1 ( ) , , ( ) 1 , 1 ( 2 1 p - - r q + q + F = l
If both Bea and Jeff do not smoke, that is,  ) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( 2 1 = y y , then the contribution
of such an observation to the likelihood function is
(17) R W W p - r - - F = ) , , ( ) 0 , 0 ( 2 1 l
If Bea smokes but Jeff does not, that is,  ) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 2 1 = y y , then the contribution of
such an observation to the likelihood function is
(18) ) , , ( ) 0 , 1 ( 2 1 r - q - - F = W W l
Similarly, if Bea does not smoke but Jeff does, that is,  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 2 1 = y y , then the
contribution of such observation to the likelihood function is
(19) ) , , ( ) 1 , 0 ( 2 1 r - q - - F = W W lHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 25
With sufficiently rich data, we can estimate not only the structural parameters
but also the incidental parameters  ) , ( p r  by maximizing the likelihood function
defined in (15) through (19).
The main drawback of the mixing-probability approach is that the number
of incidental parameters increases nonlinearly with family size.  For example, in
the 3-sibling family described in part in Figure 3, we would in principle need one
distinct mixing parameter for each of the four regions in which there are two
equilibria.  In this 3-sibling case, we can economize on incidental parameters by
assuming that there is a single mixing parameter p, which represents the
probability that the equilibrium with the larger number of smokers, that is, the
larger value of  3 2 1 y y y + + , will prevail.  With four or more siblings, however,
the number of potential incidental parameters can become unwieldy, and the
choice of economizing restriction is less obvious.
Fortunately, as shown in Table 1, the vast majority of households in our
data set contained no more than 3 young people.  In both 2- and 3-sibling
households, as we shall see below, our maximum likelihood estimates of the
structural parameters were robust with respect to alternative specifications of the
mixing probabilities, even though such mixing probabilities could not be
estimated with precision.  Put differently, at the maximum likelihood estimates,
the density of the region of multiple equilibria (which, in the 2-family case,
corresponds to the quantity R in equation (15)) turned out to be quite small.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 26
Expanding on the specification in equation (11), we denote the smoking
behavior of young person i in household h, which contains  h n  young people,
by the binary variable  ih y , where
(20) 1 = ih y  if  0 ) 1 ( ‡ d + n + q + - a + g + b ih h ih h h ih Y n Z X , and






jh ih y Y denotes the number of siblings of young person i who
currently smoke; each  h n  is independently identically normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ r ; each  ih d  is independently identically normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance  r - 1 ; and  } , , , , { r g b a q are unknown
parameters.  Under this random-effects error structure, each combined
disturbance term  ih h ih d + n = e  is normally distributed with zero mean and unit
variance.  Moreover,  j i jh ih „ r = e e for ] E[ , that is, the disturbances  } { ih e  may be
correlated within the household, even if they are independent across households.
Our estimation and testing strategy proceeded from the particular to the
general.  We first estimated the structural model (20) for the subset of 2-sibling
families alone under the assumption, detailed above, that in cases of two possible
equilibria, there was a probability p that the equilibrium with the larger value of
ih Y  would prevail.  With fixed  2 = h n , this case permitted us to estimate theHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 27
structural parameter q, but not the parameter a, which is indistinguishable
from the constant term implicit in the vector  ) , ( h ih Z X .
Second, we estimated the structural model (20) for the subset of 3-sibling
families alone under the equivalent assumption that in cases of two possible
equilibria, there was a probability p that the equilibrium with the larger value of
ih Y  would prevail.  In the 3-sibling analysis, the likelihood function is analogous
to that shown for the 2-sibling family in equations (15) through (19), and the
relevant multivariate probit integrals can be computed by standard quadrature
methods.  Again, with fixed  3 = h n , this case provided us with a separate
estimate of the parameter q, but not the parameter a.
Third, our maximum likelihood analyses of 2-, and 3-sibling households,
which constituted the vast majority of multi-sibling households, gave imprecise
point estimates of the parameters p and r.  We therefore investigated the
robustness of our estimates of the structural parameters  ) , , ( q g b  with respect to
the values of p and r.  For subsequent models that included households with 4
or more siblings, whose estimation was computationally burdensome, we then
specified the fixed values of p and r that yielded the most conservative
estimates of peer influence.
Fourth, in pooled analyses of all households with 1 to 4 siblings, we were
able to identify not only the parameter q, but also the parameter a.  From this
information, we could also recover the parameter  a + q = k .  Since  0 > k  andHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 28
0 < a , the null hypothesis of symmetric social influence would mean that
0 = a + k  or, equivalently,  0 2 = a + q .  To test this null hypothesis against the
two-sided alternative, we computed the ratio of the likelihood for the
constrained version of model (20), where  0 2 = a + q , divided by that for the
unconstrained version of (20).
Fifth, in our pooled samples of households with 4 or fewer siblings, we
formally tested the hypotheses that that the peer-influence parameters q and a
depended on family size.  In particular, we assumed the linear link functions:
) 1 ( 1 0 - q + q = q h n  and  ) 1 ( 1 0 - a + a = a h n , so that the specification in equation
(20) becomes
(21) 1 = ih y  if
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 0
2
1 0 ‡ d + n + - q + q + - a + - a + g + b ih h ih h ih h h h ih Y n Y n n Z X ,
and   0 = ih y  otherwise,
From the parameter estimates in (21), we could then recover the dependence of
the parameter k on family size as well, that is,  ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 0 0 - a + q + a + q = k h n .
In this context, to test the null hypothesis of symmetric social influence against
the two-sided alternative, we computed the ratio of the likelihood for the
constrained version of model (21), where both  0 2 0 0 = a + q  and  0 2 1 1 = a + q ,
divided by that for the unconstrained version.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 29
Sixth, for our pooled samples, we estimated the reduced-form version of
the model (20), in which we assumed that both  0 = q  and  0 = a .  That is,
(22) 1 = ih y  if  0 ‡ d + n + g + b ih h h ih Z X , and
0 = ih y  otherwise,
This special case corresponds simply to a random-effects probit model in which
the parameter r is estimated.  Comparison of the estimated parameters  ) , ( g b
from the reduced form model in equation (22) with those from the structural
model (20) permitted us to assess the “social multiplier” associated with within-
family peer influence.  In this context, we focused specifically on the contrast
between the structural effect and the reduced-form effect of an increase in the
real price of cigarettes.
Finally, we performed a number of sensitivity analyses.  We analyzed a
pooled sample of families with 2 to 4 siblings, excluding households with only
one young person.  We studied an alternative model to (21) where the peer-
influence parameter q depended on a young person’s age.  We also estimated
the model of equation (20) under the dubious assumption that the variable  ih Y ,
the number of siblings of young person i who currently smoke, was exogenous.
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In separate analyses of 2- and 3-sibling households, our estimates of the
peer-influence parameter q were always positive and statistically significant.  InHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 30
12,632 two-sibling households alone, we obtained  521 . 0 ˆ = q  with a 95%
confidence interval of [0.488, 0.554], while in 1,786 three-sibling households
alone, we observed  445 . 0 ˆ = q  with a 95% confidence interval of [0.277, 0.613].  In
both cases, the maximum likelihood estimates of the probability of multiple
equilibria were quite small.  In the 2-sibling case, the estimated probability that
the disturbances  ) , ( 2 1 e e  were contained in central rectangle in Figure 2 was only
0.013.  In the 3-sibling case, the combined probability that the disturbances
) , , ( 3 2 1 e e e  were contained in one of the analogous regions in Figure 3 was 0.040.
Empirically, the existence of multiple equilibria did not turn out to be a
statistically significant problem but, as a result, our data were uninformative
about the values of the parameters p and r.  While the point estimates were
1 ˆ = p  and  0 ˆ = r , the corresponding 95% confidence intervals included virtually
all values in the feasible intervals (that is,  1 0 £ p £  and  1 0 £ r £ ).  Put differently,
the likelihood function was nearly flat when projected onto the  ) , ( r p  subspace.
Despite the uncertainty in p and r, we found that the estimates of the
structural parameters (including, for example, the effect of cigarette prices) were
nonetheless quite robust.  The robustness for the peer-influence parameter q is
specifically depicted in Figure 4 below.  In the Figure, we re-estimated the model
(including the parameters  ) , , , ( r q g b ) for various fixed values of the mixing
parameter p.  In both 2- and 3-sibling households, the estimates q ˆ  displayed
only a relatively small degree of dependence on p.  Moreover, the estimatedHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 31
values of q were lowest when the parameter p was fixed at the maximum
likelihood estimate of  1 ˆ = p .
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.]
Since the assumption that p and r equaled their respective point
estimates  1 ˆ = p  and  0 ˆ = r  gave conservative estimates of the key parameter q,
we retained this assumption in our subsequent analyses.  In particular, for 308
four-sibling families alone, we obtained  396 . 0 ˆ = q  with a 95% confidence interval
of [0.318, 0.473], while in 50 five-sibling households alone, we observed  241 . 0 ˆ = q
with a 95% confidence interval of [0.080, 0.402].
The column identified as equation (20) in Table 2 shows our estimates of
the parameters q and a in equation (20), as well as the estimated coefficient g
for cigarette price, in a pooled sample of 49,898 households with 1 to 4 siblings.
Given maximum likelihood estimates of  479 . 0 ˆ = q  and  150 . 0 ˆ - = a , we computed
329 . 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ = a + q = k .  As Table 2 further shows, the null hypothesis of symmetric
peer influence, namely,  0 = a + k , was strongly rejected ( 6 10 P - < ).  At the
sample means of the right-hand side variables, each additional smoking sibling
raised the probability of smoking by an estimated 7.6 percent, while each non-
smoking sibling lowered the probability by an estimated 3.5 percent.  Thus, the
pro-smoking influence of a sibling who smokes is more than twice the deterrent
effect of a non-smoking sibling.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 32
The results for equation (20) in Table 2 permitted us to recover the
remaining parameters in our learning model of Section III.  In particular, the
sensitivity l of a peer’s smoking as a test of its “coolness” was an estimated
0.366 (approximate 95% confidence interval, 0.335–0.397), while the specificity w
was an estimated 0.737 (approximate 95% confidence interval, 0.701–0.772).  Put
differently, if smoking is “uncool,” then Bea believes that there is about a 74%
probability that her brother Jeff will not smoke.  But if smoking is “cool,” then
there is only about a 37% probability that Jeff will smoke.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
In our analysis of subsets of households of different size, we found that
the estimated values of q were inversely related to the number of young people.
We therefore investigated a model, specified in equation (21), wherein both the
peer-influence parameters q and a depended on family size through the linear
link functions  ) 1 ( 1 0 - q + q = q h n  and  ) 1 ( 1 0 - a + a = a h n .  The parameter
estimates for the resulting model, based upon the pooled sample of 49,898
households with 1 to 4 siblings are also shown in Table 2.  We found that while
the parameter q declined with the number of siblings, the parameter a did not.
Thus, as the number of siblings in the household increased, the pro-smoking
influence of any one smoking sibling was diluted, while the anti-smoking
influence of a non-smoking sibling was not clearly dependent on family size.  In
particular, in a two-sibling family (that is,  2 = h n ), the estimated values of q andHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 33
a were 0.513 and  127 . 0 - , respectively, and the corresponding values of the
sensitivity l and specificity w were 0.297 and 0.798, respectively.  In a four-
sibling family, the estimated values of q and a were 0.387 and  153 . 0 - ,
respectively, and the corresponding values of the sensitivity l and specificity w
were 0.442 and 0.650, respectively.  As in equation (20), our likelihood ratio test
strongly rejected the null hypothesis of symmetric peer influence in the pooled
sample of families all sizes.  Moreover, the values of q in models where the
parameters were estimated separately for subsets of households of different sizes
were indistinguishable from the values estimated from equation (21) in the
pooled sample of households of all sizes.  (Results not shown.)
By way of sensitivity analysis, we found that the influence parameter q
did not vary significantly with each sibling’s age.  (Results not shown.)  When we
used standard random-effects probit methods to estimate equations (20) and (21)
under the dubious assumption that the number of smoking siblings  ih Y  was
exogenous, we obtained estimates of  90 . 0 » q  and  22 . 0 - » a , values that (in
absolute terms) significantly overstated those shown in Table 2.  (Detailed results
not shown.)
The right-most column of Table 2 shows the estimate of the coefficient for
cigarette price in the reduced-form model of equation (22).  The estimated
coefficient of price in the reduced form model was 1.6 times the value derived
from the structural models of (20).  At the sample means of the right-hand side
variables, each $1-increase in the real price of a carton of cigarettes (or 10-centHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 34
increase in the price per pack) reduced the probability of smoking in the
reduced-form model (20) by 0.0060, while it reduced the probability of smoking
in the structural model (21) by only 0.0038.  Thus, we found that the marginal
deterrent effect of a price increase on the probability of smoking, as derived from
the reduced form model, was likewise about 60 percent greater than the marginal
effect of price derived from the structural model.  This comparison gives us an
estimate of the social multiplier effect of peer influence within the household.
The full set of parameter estimates for equations (20) through (22) in Table
2 are shown in the Results Appendix.  In particular, we found that the effect of a
household adult’s smoking is only about two-thirds that of a younger peer’s
smoking.  In separate sensitivity analyses, we rejected the possibility that older
siblings had more influence than younger ones.  (Results not shown.)  We also re-
estimated our pooled analyses with a subset of 14,781 families with 2, 3, or 4
siblings, but the results were not markedly different from those reported here.
(Results also not shown.)
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analyses of smoking practices among young people aged 15–24 in a
large nationwide sample of U.S. households polled during the 1990s strongly
confirmed the hypothesis of asymmetric social influence.  We found that the pro-
smoking influence of a sibling who smokes is more than twice the deterrentHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 35
effect of a non-smoking sibling.  Moreover, the pro-smoking influence of any
particular smoking peer was partially diluted in households with larger numbers
of young people, but even in households with up to 5 young residents, the pro-
smoking social influence of a smoker continued to dominant the deterrent effect
of a nonsmoker.
Our results can be interpreted in terms of a model of information
externalities, in which each young person, who is uncertain about the risks and
benefits of smoking, learns about such risks and benefits from peers’ smoking
practices.  In particular, a young person employs the information contained in
each of her peer’s smoking practices to update her prior probability that smoking
is safe, non-addictive, and the socially acceptable, in short, the “cool” thing to do.
In this process of Bayesian updating, each peer’s smoking becomes, in effect, a
diagnostic test with its own sensitivity and specificity.   In this context, we
estimated that, on average, the sensitivity of a peer’s smoking was 37 percent,
while the specificity was 74 percent.  Put differently, young Bea believes that if
smoking were in fact “uncool,” then there would be only about a one-in-four
chance that her brother Jeff would smoke anyway.  But if smoking were in fact
“cool,” then she believes that there would be a nearly two-thirds chance that Jeff
could still be a nonsmoker.
The dilution of a smoker’s influence in large families can likewise be
expressed in terms of sensitivity and specificity.  If Jeff were Bea’s only sibling,
then we estimated that Bea would attach about a 30-percent sensitivity and anHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 36
80-percent specificity to his smoking.  By contrast, if Jeff were just one of Bea’s
three siblings, then the sensitivity of Jeff’s smoking would rise to about a 44
percent, while the specificity would fall to about 65 percent.  In the medical
literature, repeated testing alters an individual test’s accuracy when the tests are
not independent, often because the populations of persons with and without the
disease are heterogeneous (Dendukuri and Joseph [2001], Qu and Hadgu [1998],
Torrance-Rynard and Walter [1997]).  In the present context, our findings
concerning diluted influence suggest that young people in fact understand the
interdependence of their peers’ smoking practices.  Thus, if Pepe already smokes,
Jeff’s smoking is less influential for Bea because she recognizes that Jeff is
smoking, at least in part, because Pepe is.
Our model of asymmetric information externalities could be applied to
many other fields, especially financial markets, where traders infer good and bad
news from the upward and downward price movements of securities
(Bikhchandani , Hirshleifer, and Welch [1992, 1998] and Lux [1998]).  It has
obvious applications in other contexts, including local crime rates (Glaeser,
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman [1996]) and school performance (Sacerdote [2001],
Hoxby [2002], and Winston and Zimmerman [2003]).  In the classroom, for
example, the behavior of good students who “set an example” may be highly
informative about the value of regular studying and attendance, while the
behavior of poor students may be uninformative.  In the present context, our
analysis cautions those who might distinguish too sharply between “peerHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 37
influence” and “knowledge” theories of youth smoking initiation (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services [1994]).
Comparing the results from a reduced form model to our structural
estimates, we estimated that the aggregate deterrent effect of an increase in
cigarette price on youth current smoking prevalence was approximately 60
percent greater than the sum of the deterrent effects on each individual
separately.  Our analysis thus provides an important explanation for the
apparently large price responsiveness of youth smoking found by numerous
researchers (e.g., Chaloupka and Pacula [1999], Chaloupka and Wechsler [1995],
Emery, White, and Pierce [2001], Harris and Chan [1999], Lewit and Coate
[1982]).  Although the static equilibrium model employed in this paper (the
“family smoking game”) allowed for asymmetric peer influence, it did not by
itself generate asymmetric social multipliers.  While we might consider more
complex static models, or even dynamic models of youth smoking, we leave the
modeling and estimation of such asymmetric social multipliers to later work.
Nonetheless, asymmetric social multipliers may be an important source of
asymmetric responses of demand to increases and reductions in cigarette taxes
and other measures intended to reduce youth smoking.
Our structural model of peer influence entailed a system of simultaneous
equations in discrete endogenous variables.  While this approach permitted us to
address a number of problems in the analysis of peer effects, particularly the
problem of reflection (Manski [1993]), such models are known to be susceptibleHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 38
to the problem of multiple equilibria.  Fortunately, in our applied work with
households of 2 and 3 young people, which constituted the vast majority of those
in our sample, those regions within the disturbance space where multiple
equilibria could obtain had too small a probability to influence our estimates of
the key structural parameters.  Our results thus offer an illustration of a theorem
by Tamer [2002] that when the data are sufficiently rich, parameters can be
identified even when the model is, strictly speaking, incomplete.
Other researchers have attempted to apply non-Nash equilibrium
concepts to the analysis of small-group data (e.g., Chao [2002], Bjorn and Vuong
[1997], and Kooreman [1994]).  In the context of a couple’s decision about
contraception, studied by Chao [2002], for example, there is a natural asymmetry
between man and woman (and the contraceptive pill and male condom) that
lends itself to a Stackelberg specification, in which one “player” can commit to
moving first.  In our context, one might conjecture that an older sibling could
pre-commit to cigarette smoking by virtue of its addictive propensity.  However,
there is evidence that addiction to cigarettes develops gradually along a
continuum during youth (Harris and Chan [1999]) and, in any case, we found no
evidence that older siblings had a greater peer influence than younger ones.
Our empirical analysis is subject to a number of limitations.  We were able
to attach specific cigarette prices from the ACCRA database to only about 64
percent of the households polled about smoking in the Current Population
Survey.  However, we have no evidence that the excluded households differedHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 39
materially with respect to any factor that might determine youth smoking rates.
We are conscious that state-level cigarette prices may be endogenous because the
overall prevalence of smoking among adults (as well as young people) in a state
may influence the political acceptability of a hike in the state cigarette excise
taxes.  However, we see the ACCRA prices, which are specific to metropolitan
areas and non-metropolitan counties, as less susceptible to such criticism.
We are likewise aware that the Tobacco Use Supplements to the CPS
during the 1990s contained more than 30 percent of proxy responses.  Since the
CPS is designed so that one proxy typically answers for multiple respondents in
the same household, we see potential biases in proxy responses primarily as a
“common shock” within the household, which we specifically addressed in our
mixed-effects error specification.   What is more, we assumed that while youth
smoking was endogenous within the household, the smoking practices of adults
were exogenous.  While there is a literature on the influence of parental quitting
on youth smoking (e.g., Farkas et al. [1999]), less is known about the reverse.
Thus, the peer influence of adults in the household could have mediated some of
the social influence among young people that we measured here.  Moreover, our
data did not permit us to address the global influence of peer groups outside the
home.  We have confirmed only that, at least within the household, peer effects
can be highly local.
In our econometric analyses of 2- and 3-sibling households, we were able
to compute maximum likelihood estimates even when the disturbance spaceHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 40
contained regions with multiple equilibria, and even when the disturbances were
not independent.  In these small households, the number of such regions and the
variety of multiple equilibria were limited, and the multivariate probit integrals
could be computed reliably by quadrature methods.  However, as the number of
players in the “family smoking game” increased beyond three, the rapidly
growing computational burden forced us to impose restrictions on the possible
equilibria.  For larger groups with very large numbers of possible equilibria,
simulation methods, such as those suggested by Krauth [2001] and Tamer [2002,
2003] may prove necessary.
Nonetheless, our results validate the use of statistical methods that
properly account for the endogeneity of peer behaviors.  Thus, when we
estimated our structural model under the dubious assumption that siblings’
smoking practices were exogenous, we obtained estimates of peer influence that
substantially exceeded those obtained when we treated such behaviors as
endogenous.  Our results thus illustrate why economists cannot ignore the
problem of reflection, originally articulated by Manski [1993], in studies of peer
effects.
The implications of asymmetry in social interactions for the study of
youth smoking and other fields of economic inquiry are substantial.  If the pro-
smoking social influence of a smoker exceeds the deterrent influence of her
nonsmoking counterpart, then policies to segregate smokers will reduce overall
smoking rates.  If the effects of price changes are asymmetric, then the price warHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 41
in the early 1990s in the highly concentrated U.S. cigarette market may have
enhanced youth smoking, dollar for dollar, more than the price increases
effectuated by excise tax hikes or settlement payments later in the same decade.
What is more, those who would seek to deter youth smoking through higher
cigarette taxes, antismoking messages, or other restrictions need to ensure that
such policies are sustained.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 42
TABLES
Table 1.  Prevalence of Current Cigarette Smoking among Young People,
Aged 15-24, in Relation to Current Smoking Status of Other Young
Household Members, Aged 15-24 a,b,c
Number of Siblings, Aged 15-24, Who Do Not Smoke
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Notes to Table 1
a.  Source: Combined Tobacco Use Supplements of the CPS during September
1992 – May 1993, September 1995 – May 1996, and September 1998 – May
1999. (U.S. Bureau of the Census [1996, 1998]).
b.  The four entries in each cell are, respectively: the percentage of young people,
agd 15–24, who are current smokers; the total number of young people in the
cell; the total number of households in the cell; and the log odds of the









ln , where  p is smoking
prevalence.
c.  A current smoker is a respondent who answered “some days” or “every day”
to the question, “Do you smoke cigarettes some days, every day, or not at
all?”  Among 126,352 respondents with known smoking status, we excluded
3,809 who resided in families where the smoking status of at least one other
sibling was unknown.  Not shown are the data for another 533 respondents
who resided in families with more than 3 nonsmoking siblings or more than 3
smoking siblings.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 44
Table 2.  Estimates of the Peer-Influence Parameters and the Coefficient of
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0 q Intercept of
) 1 ( 1 0 - q + q = q h n
0.576
[0.517, 0.635]
1 q Slope of
) 1 ( 1 0 - q + q = q h n
-0.063
[-0.098, -0.027]
0 a Intercept of
) 1 ( 1 0 - a + a = a h n
-0.114
[-.161, -0.067]
1 a Slope of
) 1 ( 1 0 - a + a = a h n
-0.013
[-.037, 0.011]
k a + q 0.329
[0.308, 0.350]
0 k 0 0 a + q 0.462
[0.410, 0.514]
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Figure 1.  Young Person’s Smoking Decision Tree
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Figure 2.  Equilibria in the  ) , ( 2 1 e e Plane in the 2-Sibling
Family Smoking GameHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 46










Figure 4.  Relation between the Mixing Parameter p and the Estimate of
q for Households with 2 and 3 Siblings.  (Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.)
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Figure 3.  Equilibria in the  ) , ( 3 2 e e  Plane in the 3-Sibling
Family Smoking Game When  q - - ‡ e > q - - 2 1 1 1 W W
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DATA APPENDIX
We analyzed data from the Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS) to the
Current Population Survey (CPS), a nationally representative household-based
survey of the U.S. population aged 15 years or more (U.S. Bureau of the Census
[1996, 1998] ).  The TUS has an extended history of use in the economic analysis
of cigarette smoking.  (See, e.g., Marcus et al. [1989], Shopland et al. [1996],
Gerlach et al. [1997], Arday et al. [1997], Ohsfeldt, Boyle, and Capilouto [1998],
Hersch [2000], Sweeney et al. [2000], and Shopland et al. [2001].  For TUS-based
studies of adolescent and young-adult smoking, see also Cummings and Shah
[1995], Gilpin et al. [1999], Farkas et al. [1999], Anderson and Burns [2000], and
Gilpin et al. [2000].)  During the 1990s, the TUS was administered during nine
monthly installments of the CPS, which we grouped into three successive
“waves” as follows: (1) September 1992, January 1993 and May 1993; (2)
September 1995, January 1996 and May 1996; and (3) September 1998, January
1999 and May 1999.
To determine an individual’s current smoking status, the TUS asked each
self-respondent or, if unavailable, a proxy respondent, “Has … smoked at least
100 cigarettes in his/her entire life?” If the answer was affirmative, then the TUS
further queried, “Does … now smoke every day, some days, or not at all?”  A
current smoker answered “yes” to the first question and either “every day” or
“some days” to the second, while a non-smoker answered either “no” to the first
question or “not at all” to the second.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 48
Out of 1,037,644 individual TUS records for all three waves combined, a
total of 145,783 (or 14 percent) represented persons aged 15–24 years.  Of these,
126,352 records (or 87 percent) gave informative responses to the two
aforementioned questions about smoking status.  (Virtually all of the remaining
19,431 non-responses came from proxy respondents.)  This data set of 126,352
responses among young person served as the basis for the calculations shown in
Table 1.
Among the 126,352 young people with known current smoking status, the
overall prevalence of current smoking was 18.6 percent, with 14.2 percent
smoking “every day” and 4.4 percent smoking “some days.”  The prevalence of
current smoking was 21.2% among self-respondents and 14.3% among proxy
respondents, who constituted 36.9 percent of the responses with known current
smoking status.   Of the 126,352 young people with known current smoking
status, we then excluded 3,809 individuals (3 percent) who resided in households
where the current smoking status of one or more siblings was unknown.  That
left a universe of 122,543 respondents in 81,662 households where each young
person’s smoking status was known.
Because the CPS was a household-based survey, we were thus able
observe the smoking practices of all young people residing in each living unit.  In
contrast to other studies where only one subject self-reports the smoking habits
of his peers, we could thus make inferences about the reciprocal influences of the
peer group on each of its members.  The Teenage Attitudes and Practices Survey,Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 49
analyzed by Krauth [2001], asked the respondent, “How many of your four best
friends smoke?”  The respondent’s “best friends,” however, were unlikely to be
in the sample.  Both the U.K. General Household Survey and the British Health
and Lifestyle Survey, analyzed by Jones [1989, 1994], asked the respondent to
report whether there are “other smokers” in the household, but it is unclear
whether these “other smokers” participated as well.  By contrast, the National
Education Longitudinal Study, a school-based analyzed by Gaviria and Raphael
[2001], asked each tenth-grader about his own smoking, drinking and illegal
drug use.  Gaviria and Raphael then inquired whether a student’s risky
behaviors were related to the average for those schoolmates, from 5 to 43 in
number, who also participated in the survey.  Farkas et al. [1999] used the 1992–
1993 wave of the TUS to test the hypothesis that 15-17-year-olds were less likely
to smoke when their parents had quit.  In the Health and Retirement Survey,
Lahiri and Song [2000] related the respondent’s smoking status to his spouse’s
smoking.
Although the CPS contained information on each subject’s gender, age,
educational attainment, work status, ethnicity, income, and other individual and
family characteristics, it did not include data on cigarette prices.  For this
purpose, we used data from contemporary surveys of retail cigarette prices
collated by ACCRA [2000], formerly the American Chamber of Commerce
Researchers’ Association.  Other studies relying on ACCRA cigarette price data
have included Chaloupka and Wechsler [1995] and Arcidiacono, Sieg, and SloanHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 50
[2001].  The ACCRA data represented the retail prices, including all applicable
excise and sales taxes and promotional discounts, of a specific premium-priced
brand of cigarettes.  Although discount cigarettes claimed a market share
exceeding 25 percent during 1992–1999, such non-premium brands were rarely
the choice of young smokers (Centers for Disease Control [1994, 2000]).
In contrast to the annual state-level prices compiled originally by the
Tobacco Institute (TI) and updated by Orzechowski and Walker [2002], the
ACCRA prices were sampled quarterly for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
and non-metropolitan areas of population 50,000 or more within each state.  We
were thus able to match each respondent with the retail price prevailing in the
metropolitan or non-metropolitan area of the household’s location and in the
calendar quarter in which the survey was performed.  (For households residing
outside of MSAs, the CPS recorded only the state of residence.  Those households
were assigned the average price for all non-metropolitan areas in the state.)  Our
tests of the concordance of the TI state-level prices and ACCRA retail prices gave
correlation coefficients between 0.89 for 1992 and 0.95 for 1998.  For a given year,
the between-state variability of the ACCRA prices was slightly lower than that of
the TI prices.  This finding may reflect the more complete inclusion of
promotional discounts in the ACCRA retail price data.
We did not make any adjustments for cross-border shopping.  In attempts
to take account of this phenomenon, some researchers have included
neighboring states’ prices (Baltagi and Levin [1986]).  Others have computed aHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 51
weighted-average of the local price and the lowest nearby price (Chaloupka
[1991]).  Still others have limited the sample to respondents living at least 20
miles from states with lower taxes (Lewit and Coate [1982], Wasserman et al.
[1991], Chaloupka and Wechsler [1995], Pacula and Chaloupka [1999]), or have
made other adjustments (Chaloupka and Pacula [1999]).  Studies of teenagers
and college students have found little effect of such price adjustments on the
estimated demand for cigarettes, perhaps because such young people have lower
mobility.
Because the geographic areas covered by the ACCRA price survey did not
entirely overlap those covered by the CPS, we could not assign a price to each
young person in the TUS sample.  In particular, ACCRA provided price data on
only 194 out of the 280 MSAs that the CPS surveyed.  Out of 122,543 subjects
who lived in households where each young person’s smoking status was known,
we could therefore assign prices to 78,038 (or 63.7 percent).  The coverage was
62.8 percent of the CPS-surveyed residents of MSAs and 69.1 percent of the
residents of non-metropolitan areas.  The prevalence of current smoking among
the 78,038 remaining subjects in our pooled cross-sectional sample was 18.5
percent, while the smoking prevalence among the excluded individuals was 18.6
percent.
Of the 78,038 young people with known smoking status, known sibling
smoking status and known ACCRA-based price, we excluded an additional
10,570 subjects (or 13.5%) who had missing data on any of the remainingHarris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 52
explanatory variables used in the analysis.  This left a total of 67,468 complete
observations in our analytical sample.  In that sample, 34,557 individuals (or
51.2%) lived in households with no other young people (that is,  1 = h n  in
equation (20) above).  A total of 25,743 individuals (or 38.2%) lived in 2-sibling
households; 5,519 (or 8.2%) lived in 3-sibling households; 1,275 (or 1.9%) lived in
4-sibling households; 264 (or 0.4%) lived in 5-sibling households; and 110 (or
0.2%) lived in households with 6 or 7 young people.
The variables employed in our analysis are shown in Appendix Table A1.
In addition to current smoking status (corresponding to  ih y  in equation (20)
above), we have classified the explanatory variables as individual-level
(corresponding to  ih X ), and household-level (corresponding to  h Z ).  The latter
subset included variables included area-level prices and wave-specific temporal
variables.  Attempting to distinguish between age-related, cohort and
contemporaneous effects, we tried various combinations of respondent’s age and
dummy variables for the respondent’s year of birth and the date of interview.
Other variables, such as sex, academic achievement, employment status,
ethnicity, are well documented in the literature.  Other researchers have
measured the influence of adult smoking (Farkas et al. [1999], Lahiri and Song
[2000]), as well as restrictions on smoking at home (Proescholdbell, Chassin, and
MacKinnon [2000], Farkas et al. [2000]).Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 53
In Table A1, we specifically included a measure of the 3-year lagged price
of cigarettes for young people aged 18–24 years in the 1995-96 wave, who would
have been aged 15–21 in the 1992-93 wave.  (See Douglas and Hariharan [1994]
for a similar use of past cigarette prices that prevailed during the prime years of
smoking initiation.)  We did not include a measure of future prices, as might be
suggested by theories of “rational” or non-myopic addiction (Becker, Grossman,
and Murphy [1994]).  As noted by Pacula and Chaloupka [1999] and Gruber
[2001], young people appear to make myopic smoking decisions because they
have high discount rates or do not fully appreciate the future health
consequences of smoking.  In any case, it is difficult to see how a non-myopic
teenager interviewed in the first two months of wave 1 (September 1992 – Jan
1993) could have forecast the industry-wide price war that brought retail prices
down later in 1993.  Nor is it obvious how a “rational” teenager interviewed in
waves 1 or 2 could have forecast the subsequent avalanche of lawsuits,
culminating in the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998, that pushed prices up
in wave 3.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 54
Table A1.  Sample Means and Standard Deviations of Variables for the 67,468






   Individual-level variables
Current smoker (binary) 0.183
Age (years) 19.332 2.942
Sex female (binary) 0.514
Married (binary) 0.125
Did not finish high school (binary) 0.086
Full-time student (binary) 0.429
Currently working (binary) 0.519
Unemployed (binary) 0.076
No parent at home (binary) 0.352
Restrictions on smoking at work (binary) 0.181
Proxy respondent (binary) 0.359
   Household-level variables




Number of persons aged >24 in
household who smoke (integer)
0.428 0.663
ln (Real family annual income)¶ 9.706 0.984
Real price per 10-pack carton ¶ 13.105 2.549
1995-96 Wave (binary ) 0.265
1998-99 Wave (binary) 0.312
Lagged real price § -0.030 0.778
¶ Deflated to constant 1992 dollars based on the Consumer Price Index.
§ For respondents who were  18 ‡  years old in the 1995-96 Wave, this variable is
















, where  t p  is the current real price and  3 - t p  is the 3-
year lagged real price.  For all other respondents, the variable equals 0.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 55
RESULTS APPENDIX
Table B1 shows the complete results for the three models (that is,
equations 20, 21 and 22) described in Table 2 in the main text.  Each cell
contains the corresponding maximum likelihood parameter estimate, below
which is shown the asymptotic standard error in parentheses.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 56
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1 q  (eq. 21) -.0629
(.0181)




1 a  (eq. 21) -.0131
(.0120)




¶ Deflated to constant 1992 dollars based on the Consumer Price Index.
§ For respondents who were  18 ‡  years old in the 1995-96 Wave, this variable
















, where  t p  is the current real price and  3 - t p  is the
3-year lagged real price.  For all other respondents, the variable equals 0.
* For equations (20) and (21), the correlation coefficient was set equal to zero,
based on separate maximum likelihood estimates for 2- and 3-sibing
households.Harris-Gonzalez 18-March-2004 Page 58
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